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Summary
This study sheds some light on some of the factors
underlying tax compliance in local authorities in
Tanzania with the help of original survey data. We
use the experience of the poll tax (locally named
"development levy" ) as our case. The survey data
indicate that tax compliance seems to be positively
related to ability to pay, the (perceived) probability
of being prosecuted, and the number of tax evaders
known personally to the respondent. Severe
sanctions, including strict enforcement and
harassment of taxpayers, and discontent with what
people feel they get in re turn from the government
roay increase tax resistance, and, thus contribute
to explain the widespread evasion observed.
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L. Introduction
Tax evasion seems to take place in practically every country in the world, and should be
considered a potential problem everywhere. Stil, evasion is a phenomenon which hits developing
countries hardest. Studies in different developing countries indicate that it is not uncommon for
half or more of the potential tax revenues to be uncollected (Bird, 1989, 1992; Alm et aL., 1991).
This tax base erosion has had a variety of fiscal effects and there are at least three reasons for
concern. First, revenue losses from non-compliance are particularly critical in a con text of
substantial budget deficit. Second, both horizontal and vertical equity suffer since the effective
tax rates faced by individuals may differ because of different opportunities for tax evasion (Alm
et aL., 1991: 849). Third, the expanding underground economic activities, which are of ten the
other face of tax evasion, may affect the implementation and outcome of economic policies
(Tanzi and Shome, 1993:808). Furthermore, citizens'disrespect for the tax laws may go together
with disrespect for other laws, and, thus contribute to undermine the legitimacy of government.
Dealing with the policy problem of tax evasion requires at least some understanding of the factors
underlying the individual's decision whether to pay or evade taxes. Still, little is known with
much certainty about tax compliance behaviour in developing countries. In this study we have
attempted to use original survey data to shed light on some of the factors underlying tax
compliance in local authorities in Tanzania. We use the experience with the poll tax as our case.
The poll tax, commonly referred to as "development levy", has been in place at the local
government level since 1983/84, and is the single largest source of tax revenue for district
councils in Tanzania.! The levy is, in principle, levied on every person above the age of 18 years
and ordinarily resident in the area. (Tax Commssion, 1991). Women are exempted in many
councils.2 In most areas, the tax is levied on a flat basis. However, in some urban areas,
particularly in the wage sector, graduated rates based on income apply. In recent years, some
councils have completely abandoned the tax. There is a widespread resentment among the public
against paying the tax, and non-compliance is a serious problem.
Revenues from development levy have fallen in urban councils from over 50 per cent of total own
revenues in 1984/85 to around 25 percent in 1987/88 (Tax Commission, 1991:285), and further
down to about 10 percent in 1995 (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998). For district councils the share
remained more stable at around 60 percent in the period 1984/85 to 1987/88 (Tax Commission,
1991) but has dropped significantly during the 1990s and in 1995 represented about 25 percent of
total own revenues.3 These figures do, however, hide significant differences between individual
councils. In 1995, for instance, development levy as a percentage of total own revenues in district
A brief history of deve10pment 1evy in Tanzania is presented in Bukurura (1991) and Tripp (1997). Throughout
rural Africa poll taxes, hut taxes or vilage taxes assessed and collected at the loca1level have traditionally been
important. Generally, these taxes have been 1evied depending upon a person's circumstances, very often perceived
by local chiefs (Besley, 1993). Personal taxes of this kind have provided significant tax revenues in some
countries. In Nigeria, for example, they constituted 48 per cent of tax revenues raised in 1960-61 (Bird, 1974). In
Western countries, however, such taxes are rare1y seen in practice (a1though often occupying the pages of public
finance textbooks). One such instance was the short lived experience with the Community Charge (commonly
referred to as the Poll Tax) in the United Kingdom. The Thatcher government introduced a local poll tax in
Scot1and in 1989 and a year later in England and Wales, replacing a long-standing system of local property
taxation (Besley et aL., 1993:2). Due to widespread non-comp1iance and social unrest, inc1uding poll tax riots, the
tax was abolished and rep1aced by a return to property taxation in 1993. During this period the
Thatcher-government was also replaced.
2 The issue of women paying the 1evy has been controversial (Tripp, 1997:157). Supporters of the levy on women
argue that women are equal to men according to the 1aw and thus can own their own property. Opponents argue
that women in rural are as rarely own their own property and therefore should be exempted. In particular, the
development levy has revealed a conflct between upper- and lower-income women.
This estimate is an average for 48 district counci1s (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998). The drop in revenues from
development levy in the 1990s is partly exp1ained by the fact that that women in many counci1s were exempted
from paying levy, starting in 1992.
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councils varied from 3.3 per cent in Kilwa District Council (DC) to 63.5 per cent in Singida DC.4
The collection ratio measured as the ratio between actually reported and projected revenues from
development levy also varies significantly between councils. For instance, in Kibaha DC the ratio
between levy reported collected in 1996 and projected revenues based on population statistics was
26.7 per cent. The corresponding figure for Kilosa DC was 45.6 per cent (Fjeldstad and Semboja,
1998).5 Further, we observe large differences in the collection ratio between areas within the same
counciL. The ratio between actual reported levy and projected revenue between wards in Kibaha
DC in 1996, for example, varied from 8.9 per cent to 38.7 percent. The corresponding figures for
Kilosa DC were 13 per cent and 97 per cent, respectively.
Different arguments have been offered to explain this widespread non-compliance. Bukurura
(1991:91) argues that the evasion of development levy is for the major part due to taxpayers'
inability to pay and to a lack of clarity with respect to obligations and reasons to pay. He argues
that the government has not done a proper job in educating the public about the purposes of the
development levy and convincing them of the necessity of paying the tax. This argument is
supported by the Tax Commssion (1991:287) statement that "(als with other taxes,
understanding of the need for local revenues wil improve compliance". Implicitly these studies
assume that the critical factor behind the leve1 of tax compliance is peoples' (taxpayers') lack of
understanding of the relationship between taxes and the provision of public goods and services.
Thus, the general formula for establishing voluntar compliance, it is argued, is education and
political mobilsation. In other studies, unwilingness to pay is considered to be the result ofa
combination of political protest against to the degradation of local public services, perceptions of
unfairness sincethe charges donot take ability to pay into consideration as well as corruption and
other administrative failngs by the councils (see, for instance, URT, 1996; and Tripp, 1997).
Accordingly, the prescription is to improve the efficiency, including tax collection, of local
government councils.
The studies referred to above focus on identifying possible causes for people not paying taxes.
However, in a situation of widespread tax evasion it might be equally relevant to ask who pays
and why. Accordingly, by focusing on both compliance and non-compliance behaviour this may
enable us to explain the observed differences between and within councils with respect to tax
compliance. The purpose of this paper is to present an analytical framework which we feel takes
better account of some key variables with respect to peoples' decision making, both with respect
to compliance and evasion, and to use that framework to examine original survey data on
taxpayers' attitudes and behaviour collected during December 1996 and lune-luly 1997 in two
district councils in Tanzania. This paper describes the approach and substantive results.6
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework
for analysing tax compliance. The methodological approach and organisation of the empirical
study are addressed in section 3. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 summarises and
concludes.
4 Ibid.
5 Projected revenue is estimated as taxable population in the council multiplied with the levy rate. The large
variations between councils can also be ilustrated by the effective levy rate of the individual councils, estimated
as the ratio between actually reported levy and the taxable popu1ation in the counciL. In 1996, the effective rate
varied from 40 TSh to 936 TSh, with an average of TSh 424 for a sample of 27 councils (Fjeldstad and Semboja,
1998).
Possible implications for fiscal and institutional reforms are discussed in Fjeldstad and Semboja (1998).
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2 Theoretical framework
The relationship between a taxpayer and the local government inc1udes at least three elements.7
First, is an element of coercion, as represented by the enforcement activities of tax collectors and
the penalties imposed on those detected for non-compliance. Second, is an element of fiscal
exchange, as taxation and the provision of public goods and services may be interpreted as a
contractual relationship between taxpayers and the (local) government. A third element is the
impact of social influences on the taxpayer's compliance behaviour, for example, by affecting the
individual's perception of the probability of being detected if not paying. An individual's
perceptions, in combination with his opportunities, may determine his current choice of whether
or not to be a tax evader . 8
2.1 The coercive element
The coercive element of the taxpayer-government relationship is the focus of the c1assical tax
evasion model (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972), which assumes that the taxpayer's behaviour is
influenced by factors such as the tax rate which determines the benefits of evasion, and the
probability of detection and penalties for fraud which determine the costs. Thus, the problem is
viewed as one of rational decision making under uncertainty: Tax evasion is a gamble that either
pays off in lower taxes or, with some probability, subjects one to sanctions. This implies that if
detection is likelyand penalties are severe few people wil evade taxes.9
The conceptual framework needed to study the development levy is to some extent different from
the standard model of tax evasion which typically focuses on the dec1aration of taxable income
when detection is probabilistic. Non-payment of development levy has more to do with
disobedience than cheating (see Besley et aL., 1993:3). The local tax authorities can (in principle)
actually observe the fraction of evaders. Taxpayers cannot hide their liability except by hiding
their existence or migrating to a council which does not impose the tax or which imposes it at a
lower rate. In so far as sanctions are probabilistic it is because the tax authority's effectiveness to
effectuate sanctions is questionable. It seems, however, reasonable to suppose that taxpayers'
perceptions concerning the likelihood of being prosecuted and the severity of penalties wil affect
his choice between paying the levy or not.10
2.2 The element offiscal exchange
Compliance may be motivated by the presenee of government expenditures. Individuals may pay
taxes because they value the goods provided by the government, recognising that their payments
may be necessary both to help finance the goods and services and to get others to contribute (Alm
et aL., 1992:313). Thus, a taxpayer may be seen as exchanging purchasing power in the market in
return for government services. Fiscal exchange, however, requires trade-off gains which may be
seen as prerequisites of voluntary compliance (Levi, 1988:56). Without a material benefit,
compliance becomes less assured. The existence of positive benefits may increase the probability
7 This approach partly follows Spicer and Lundstedt (1976). Levi (1988) uses a similar approach when discussing
the conditions for creating "voluntary" compliance.
8 Opportunities to evade taxes vary across tax bases. For instance, income taxes based on tax withholding limit the
taxpayer's opportunity to evade taxes.
9 Near1y all economic approaches to tax evasion are based on this framework. Cowell (1990) is a thorough and
readab1e review of this literature.
10 Surveys and experimental studies of tax compliance in Western countries suggest that a high probability of
detection is more of a deterrent than heavy penalties. However, in a theoretical model, Christiansen (1980) finds
that the penalty rate (fine) is a relatively more efficient deterrent of tax evasion than the probability of detection.
See Kinsey's (1984) review of the literature.
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that taxpayers wil comply voluntarily, without direct coercion.11 Most taxpayers are, of course,
not able to assess the exact value of what they receive from the government in return for taxes
paid. However, it can be argued that the taxpayer has general impressions and attitudes
concerning his own and others' terms of trade with the government (Richupan, 1987:154).12 Ifthis
is the case, then it is reasonable to assume that a taxpayer's behaviour is affected by his
satisfaction or lack of satisfaction with his terms of trade with the government. Thus, if the
system of taxes is perceived to be unjust, tax evasion may, at least parly, be considered as an
attempt by the taxpayer to adjust his terms of trade with the government.13
2.3 The element of social influences
The importance of social interactions in forming tastes and actions has lon g be en stressed by
sociologists and social psychologists (see, e.g., Hessing et aL., 1988). It is reasonable to assume
that human behaviour in the area of taxation is influenced by social interactions much in the same
way as other forms of behaviour (Snavely, 1990). Tax compliance behaviour and attitudes
towards the tax system may, thus, be affected by the behaviour of an individual's reference group
such as relatives, neighbours and friends. Consequently, we may reasonably argue that if a
taxpayer knows many people in groups important to him who evade taxes, his commitment to
comply wil be weaker. 14 On the other hand, social relationships may also help deter evasion.
Individuals can be dissuaded from engaging in evasion out of fear of the social sanctions encurred
should their action be discovered and revealed public1y (Grasmick and Green, 1980; Grasmick
and Scott, 1982). Recent theoretical research on herd behaviour in economic situations (e.g., Sah,
1991), also indicates that social influences may affect compliance, in particular, by affecting the
perceived probability of detection. Thus, evidence suggests that perceptions about the ho 
nest y of
others may play an important role in compliance behaviour. 15
2.4 Hypotheses
In summar, the theoretical approaches suggest a number of predictions. The first, and probably
most obvious, is that we would expect to observe the highest compliance rates among persons
whose opportunity to evade is low and whose probabilty of being prosecuted is highest. 16
11 The potentia1 for free riding is, however, obvious when the government offers collective goods in return for taxes
(see, e.g., Cowell and Gordon, 1988; and Levi, 1988)12 Historically, unwilingness of the population to comp1y with a tax that is deemed unjust has been a catalyst for
po1itical action, e.g., the Boston tea party and the Thatcher poll tax. See Bates (1983) for examp1es from Africa.
Survey research from Western countries a1so suggests that taxpayers make judgements about the fairness of
particu1ar taxes. See, for instance, Spicer et aL. (1976) and Smith (1992).
13 In this context the taxpayer's uti lit Y derived from extra income accrued through tax evas 
ion depends on the
taxpayer's sense of equity regarding his relationship with the government. Jf the taxpayer perceives himself to be a
victim of inequity, his anger increases the marginal utility that he derives from an extra shiling of income from
tax evasion and hence increases tax evasion. On the other hand, if he perceives himself to be the beneficiary of
fisca1 inequity, his guilt fee1ings reduce his marginal utility of income from tax evasion and hence decrease tax
evasion. This idea has been developed further by Spicer and Becker (1980) as the link between (horizontal) fiscal
inequity and tax evasion.
14 One of the most consistent findings in survey research in Western countries about taxpayer attitudes and
behaviour is that those who report compliance believe that their peers and friends (and taxpayers in general)
comp1y, whereas those who report cheating believe that others cheat (see Yankelovich, Skelly and White, 1984).
Furthermore, it has been found that interpersonal networks act to reduce an individual's fear of governmental
sanctions (Mason, 1987). Few if any such studies are available for deve10ping countries.
15 This is a1so consistent with studies which find that participants in the underground economy perceive lower
probability of detection than others (e.g., Vogel, 1974; Grasmick and Scott, 1982), whi1e people generally
overestimate the chance of being audited. Work by Benjarini and Maital (1985) and Cowell (1990) has produced
mode1s in which taxpayers' decisions to evade are interdependent. These mode1s show that the growth of the black
economy weakens the ru1e of tax law and increases tax evasion.
16 We distinguish between (a) perceived probabilty which is the taxpayer's own perception of the probability of
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Second, we would expect to find that wilingness to pay is correlated with what taxpayers
perceive they get in return from the (local) government. Third, we would not be surprised to find
that the perceived honesty of peer groups (Le., family, neighbours and friends) with respect to
taxation might affect the decision to pay or not. Finally, based on previous studies, we would
expect that abilty to pay also matters.
From this initial framework, five hypotheses have been derived and tested using survey data from
Tanzania:
H l. Compliance is more likely the higher income a taxpayer has.
H 2. Compliance is more likely when the probabilty of prosecution is perceived to be high.
H 3. Compliance is more like ly when sanctions against tax evasion are perceived to be severe.
H 4. A taxpayer is more likely to comply when he perceives his terms of trade with the
government as fair.
H 5. The fewer tax evaders a taxpayer knows, the more likely he is to comply himself.
The second and third hypotheses are based on the coercive element of the taxpayer-government
relationship, while the latter two hypotheses are based on the elements of exchange with the
government and the impacts of social relations.
3 Methodology and organisation of the study
The main survey of taxpayers was carried out in Kibaha District Council, Coastal Region, in
December 1996. In luly 1997 a follow-up study was caried out in Kilosa DC, Morogoro Region.
The research design combined both quantitative and qualitative methodologies.
3.1. Methodology
The objective of the study was to assess the extent of the problems of (non- )compliance in the
study area, as well as to explore the nature of the decision making by individual taxpayers. We
were most concerned with trying to unravel people's perceptions regarding taxation and the
decisions they made, especially in relation to other taxpayers, tax collectors, politicians and the
local government council, inc1uding service provision. Accordingly, the study comprised a formal
questionnaire-type survey of taxpayers, and a semi-structured survey of local politicians, and tax
collectors at the vilage, ward and district headquarter leveIs. In addition, tax revenues for recent
years were compiled from the fies of the Vil age Executive Offcers (VEOs), Ward Executive
Officers (WEOs) and Revenue Department of the counciL 
l?
3.1.1 The questionnaire
The main objective of the questionnaire was to collect information on tax (non- )compliance
behaviour with respect to the development levy.18 Preliminary tests of the questionnaire were
carried out (which made us decide to limit the set of answer options for each question). To reduce
being detected, and (b) actual probability which is determined by the resources put into tax enforeement by the
tax collecting agency.
17 The institutiona1 set up for the loca1 government tax administration is described in detail in Fjeldstad and Semboja
(1998). A general outline is presented in appendix 1.18 The questionnaire is presented in appendix 2.
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errors of recall, we decided to focus on compliance behaviour for the last two years only, i.e.,
1995 and 1996. In Kilosa we also inc1uded 1997 (see section 3.1.2.2). In addition, we eliminated
questions which focused directly on the respondents' income, and inc1uded questions attempting
to provide indirect indicators of wealth (see annexed questionnaire). The questions were
organised around five main headings:
L. Background information on the respondent.
Of particular interest were data on occupation, main income sources and wealth of the household
since these variables are assumed to affect both the opportunity to evade and the ability to pay
taxes. Obviously, taxpayers who are employed in the agricultural sector and/or are self-employed,
have better opportunity to evade taxation than public sector employees whose development levy
is withheld by the employer. Five categories of occupation were inc1uded: (a) self-employed,
agriculture; (b) self-employed, trade and commerce (shops); (c) self-employed, other; (d)
wage-employee, private sector; and (e) wage employee, government and parastatal. The questions
in this respect focused on the main occupation of adult members of the household, and the
principal source of income of the household. Based on previous survey studies in Tanzania (e.g.,
the National CornellÆRB 1991-survey (Tinios et al., 1993), and Semboja and Therkildsen,
1989), a specific set of assets were chosen as indicators of wealth: Bicyc1e, house (own or rent),
type of house (mud wall, bloc wall, iron sheeted roof, cement floor), radio and wristwatch.
Questions on religion (Christian, Muslim, other) and place of origin (born in the area or migrant
from other regions of the country) were inc1uded, since these variables may impact on the
respondent's social network (Le., peer groups) in the local communities, and, thus, on compliance
behaviour. Marital status and age were controlled because research from Western countries
indicates that these variables may be related to (non- )compliance behaviour, for instance via
perceptions on the severity of sanctions (Kinsey, 1992:266; and Hessing et aL., 1992:292).
Il Admitted (non- )compliance
The respondents were asked if they had paid development levy in each of the two recent years
(i.e., 1995 and 1996, and in Kilosa also for the first half of 1997). Respondents giving an
affirmative answer were then asked about the rate paid. By comparing the answers with the
correct rates (known to us), we sought to establish the credibility of the answers given.
Ill Tax enforcement
A series of questions were asked on tax collection procedures, inc1uding which part of the council
was involved and how payment was made. The respondents were further asked if they knew
someone in the neighbourhood not paying (and how many) , and the types of legal sanctions
applied to non-compliers (inc1uding bringing people to court). The purpose of these questions was
to examine how contact with tax enforcers and procedures of collection might affect taxpayer
behaviour.
iv. Perceptions of others' behaviour
Respondents were asked about their perceptions of other taxpayers' behaviour regarding
compliance. ane question focused on their perception of why some people paid, while another
asked about their perception of taxpayers' decision not to comply if the probability of being
detected was low. Questions were also asked about their view of tax collectors and local
politicians with respect to integrity, and who they considered were most to blame for the
problems of collecting development levy.
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v. Perceptions of the terms of trade with the government
To measure perceptions of the terms of trade with the government, a series of questions were
asked about the quality of public services and the value received in return for tax shilings. In
particular, emphasis was put on the perceived view of the possible relationship between tax
compliance and the.provision of public services.
3.1.2 Selection of sample and administration of the survey
The pre dominant religion in the studyareas is Islam, and the majority of people are
agriculturalists. Due to its proximity to Dar es Salaam and the abundance of productive land,
many people have migrated to Kibaha from other regions. In Kilosa, too, the abundance of land
and job opportunities in the plantation sector (at present, mainly in the sugar industry) have
attracted many migrants.
3.1.2.1. The survey in Kibaha
In Kibaha, the sample inc1uded three rural vilages, i.e., Pangani, Misugusugu and Disunyara,
and one combined rural-urban vilage, i.e., Mwendapole. The vilages were selected from four
different wards on the basis of (l) representativity, which required a balanced representation of
rural and urban life, and (2) accessibility.
In order to carry out the survey, we obtained a permit letter (incidentally, with no difficulty) from
the acting District Executive Director (DED). This letter was presented to the Ward Executive
Officers (WEO) in the selected wards. The WEO accompanied us to the vilage and introduced us
to the Vilage Executive Officer (VEO).
The respondents were randomly selected from the Tax Register Books of the Vilage Executive
Officers in two of the vilages (Pangani and Misugusugu), and from the Tax Register Books of
the Ward Executive Officers in the other two (Mwendapole and Disunyara). The designated
respondent was the head of the household, since this was the person registered in the Tax Register
Book, and thus, the person who most likely managed tax matters or played a major role in
managing them on behalf of the household. The VEOs and WEOs assisted us by informing the
selected taxpayers of our visit.
Not all the selected respondents were available when we looked for them: Some had gone to their
shamba to farm, others came back late because they worked as employees or did other businesses.
Persons selected who were not available were replaced in the sample by the person next to the
selected one in the Tax Registrar Book, or, if this person was not available, by the person listed
before the selected one. This technique was also used when the selected person lived in aremote
or difficult accessible area, and was exc1uded from the sample on that basis.
Before starting the interviews all the selected respondents were gathered outside the VEO's office
in the vilage. We informed them collectively about the purpose of the study. Since specific
mention of tax evasion or compliance might have threatened the validity of responses and
reduced the willngness of respondents (and officiaIs) to participate, respondents were informed
that they were being interviewed to determine how they viewed various aspects of the local
government tax and political system. In this reg ard, we emphasised that this was a research
project, and that we were independent from the Government in this respect. Further, we made
c1ear that they had been selected randomly and that the interviews would be treated in full
confidentiality and that no names were to be noted, so their answers could not be traced back to
them.
7
The interviews of taxpayers were carried out in Swahili by three research assistants recruited from
the University of Dar es Salaam (all with a Master's degree in economics). They had been trained
in interview techniques beforehand, and had also gone through a brief course focusing on the
local government tax administration and fiscal system. The interviews took place outside hearing
and talking distance of neighbours and other vilagers, but within seeing distance. Each interview
ranged in length from 45 minutes to one hour. At the start of each interview the research
assistants (once more) made it c1ear that the interviews were to be conducted in full
confidentiality. No attempt was made to ask or note the name of the respondents. During the
survey, the team leaders spent most of the time together with the research assistants supervising
their conduct.
Altogether 134 taxpayers were interviewed, of whom 33 in Pangani vilage, 31 in Misugusugu, 31
in Mwendapole and 39 in Disunyara. 6 persons were later exc1uded from the sample (4 from
Mwendapole and 2 from Disunyara) since they had been exempted from paying the levy (4 due to
mental and/or physical ilness, one woman, and one retired soldier). The final sample, therefore,
inc1uded 128 respondents (see table 3.1).
3.1.2.2 The survey in Kilosa
The design of the survey in Kilosa was similar to the Kibaha-survey. However, in contrast to
Kibaha, tax collection at the vilage level in Kilosa was carried out by the ward office and
organised by the Ward Executive Officer (WEO).19 The vilage executive officers were to a large
extent exc1uded from the collection process (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998). Three vilages in
three different wards were selected on the basis of the same criteria as in Kibaha. The sample
inc1uded the rural vilages of Chanzuru in Chanzuru ward and Mamoyo in Mabwerebwere ward,
and the rural-urban vilage of Dumila in Dumila ward. Tax Register Books were, however,
unavailable in both Chanzuru and Dumila wards. According to the Ward Executive Officers,
these books had either been stolen or had just disappeared. Lists of names of development levy
payers were provided on hand-written sheets of paper by the WEOs. Respondents were randomly
selected on the basis of these lists. For Mamoyo vil age the sample was selected on the basis of
the Tax Register Book made available by the ward executive officer. Even here the list had just
been compiled by the newly appointed WEO.
25 respondents were selected from each of the three vilages. However, in Dumila only 9 people
were interviewed. This had to do partly with people refusing to participate for fear of this exercise
being linked with tax collection, and partly because they were not accessible due to the harvesting
season. In Chanzuru, 21 of the selected respondents showed up. In Mamoyo vilage only a few
persons show ed up initially. The rest refused to participate and ran away when people from the
ward office approached them, or they were not accessible. Therefore, we decided to pick
randomly people passing on the road by the ward office during the day. On this basis 20
respondents from Mamoyo vilage were selected. 6 respondents were later exc1uded from the
sample either because they were exempted from paying levy (1 from Dumila and 3 from
Mamoyo) or because they had never paid development levy (2 Maasai people from Chanzuru).
The final sample in Kilosa therefore inc1uded 44 people (see table 3.1). In addition to 1995 and
1996, we inc1uded questions on tax payments for 1997 in spite of the fact that the deadline for
paying development levy voluntarily did not expire until L October.
The representativity of the sample in Kilosa is questionable, both with respect to the size of the
sample and how it was selected. In particular, the degree to which the small sample from Dumila
vilage is representative, is questionable. Further, only two of the respondents were traders (both
from Chanzuru vilage), and one was a wage employee in the private sector (from Mamoyo
19 See appendix 1.
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vilage). The rest, i.e., 41 persons were peasants. This occupational distribution, however,
probably reflects fairly well the relative importanee of the different occupations in the research
area. The average household size of the sample is 7 persons, which is identical with Kibaha, and
also reflects fairly well the average rural household size in Tanzania of 6.37 persons (Tinios et aL.,
1993, table 3.1.1).
Several of the standard methodological criteria for selecting survey samples were not followed in
Kilosa. Thus, the Kilosa survey should be considered a case study from which we should be
careful to draw general conclusions. However, the Kilosa case is included in the paper since it
tells an important story about taxpayers' behaviour and tax enforeement in local authorities in
Tanzania: It describes the administrative chaos, the lack of files (which had disappeared),
taxpayers who ran away when collectors were approaching them, and enforcement of
development levy starting during the voluntary period 3 months before the deadline. Further, it
describes a story of harassment of taxpayers, the use of the local militia and road blocks in tax
collection, and the opposition, anger and frustration expressed by taxpayers. Finally, it ilustrates
how problematic it may be to carry out a proper survey on such sensititive issues in certain areas
in Tanzania.
Table 3.1. The survey sites in Kibaha and Kilosa
Tumbi Pangani 138 33
Visiga Misugusugu 348 31
Kibaha Mwendapole 566 27
Mlandizi Disunyara 257 37
* Compi1ed from the Tax Registrar Books of the Vilage Executive Officers
and Ward Executive Officers.
3.2 Data analysis and problems
We acknowledge the usual limitations of survey methods when compared with precise
experimental forms, yet found the more rigorous methods unsuitable in this particular research
effort. The selection of questionnaire items inevitably raised questions about validity and
reliability. A careful design of questions and pre-test assured a fairly high degree of face and
content validity. In surveys of tax evasion in Western countries (e.g., Kinsey, 1992; Cowell, 1990;
Spicer et aL., 1976) it is argued that because tax evasion is considered to be socially undesirable,
responses to a questionnaire wil be adversely biased. This might also be the case in Tanzania,
although anecdotes suggest that tax evasion is not associated with the type of social stigma
referred to in Western countries. In contrast, some observers describe non-payment of
development levy as a form of popular opposition towards state policies (Tripp, 1997: 154).20 If
20 Tripp (1997:8), focusing on the informal sector in Dar es Sa1aar, argues that tax evasion may be understood as
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this description is correct, we would expect an "inverse adverse bias" compared to surveys from
developed countries, i.e., a larger share of the respondents claims not to have paid relative to the
actual compliance rate. However, in our data we do not find any indications of such an inverse
relationship. Acknowledging the possible problems of biased responses, there seems to be no
other systematic way to obtain this kind of data.
The challenge (and problem) became one of designing questions which would elicit honest
responses and also provide a valid indirect measure of behaviour. Experiences from surveys of
tax evasion in Western countries, however, find that responses which are fairly directly related to
the individual's own propensity to commt tax evasion may be obtained by clearly guaranteeing to
the respondent complete confidentiality (see Spicer et aL., 1976; Kinsey, 1992).
The share of compliers in the sample is significantly higher than the figures of aggregate
compliance rates compiled from the Tax Register Books in Kibaha and the accounts of the
revenue department in Kilosa. At least three factors may explain this possible
"overrepresentation" of compliers. First, the way the samples were selected. Due to time and
budget constraints we decided to exclude from the sample taxpayers living in more remote areas
of the selected vilages. We would expect that people living in those areas are less compliant than
people living in more accessible places, because of less strict tax enforcement. Thus, a certain
overrepresentation of compliers in the sample seems reasonable. Further, the reluctance of the
population to participate in the survey in Kilosa may have led to an over-representation of
compliers there (see section 3.1.2.2). However, we do not expect this to seriously affect the
results of the analysis, since we are mainly interested in analysing (non- )compliance behaviour.
Second, it may be due to strategic answering. To supplement measures of non-compliance, we
asked the respondents about how much they had paid in development levy in each of the recent
two years. These answers were then checked against the actual development levy rate.2! aur
assumption was that non-compliers claiming to have paid the levy would often be unable to
provide correct answers on the rates. Of those claiming to have paid in Kibaha in 1995 and 1996,
only 7 percent and 4 percent, respectively, said they didn't know the rates. When asked about the
specific rates for 1995, 65 percent of those claiming to have paid said TSh 500 and 13 percent
said TSh 750 (which are the correct rates, without and with penalty, respectively). For 1996, 92
percent of the declared compliers said TSh 1000 and 4 percent said TSh 1500 (which are the rates
without and with penalty). The 1996 response may indicate a relative high degree of non-strategic
answering. The figures for 1995 may, however, indicate a certain strategic bias in the answers, or,
alternatively, errors of recall. In Kilosa, 88 percent of those claiming to have paid in 1997 said
TSh 2000. For 1996, 73 percent said TSh 1000 and L L percent said TSh 1500 (which are the rates
without and without penalty). However, for 1995 only 55 percent of those claiming to have paid
answered TSh 1000. These responses may indicate a higher degree of strategic bi as in Kilosa
compared to Kibaha. Controlling for background variables such as age and migration, we find
that the age group below 30 years in Kilosa is over-representated among those claiming to have
paid but providing wrong response on the rates.
Third, we have found evidence that embezzlement of tax revenues by collectors are prevalent in
many local authorities in Tanzania (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998). These findings are supported
by surveys carried out by the Anti-Corrption Commssion (1996), as well as anecdotal evidence.
Thus, tax revenues reported in the accounts of local authorities may be significantly lower than
one of many forms of "quiet strategies of resistance in the form of economic non-compliance".
21 In Kibaha DC, the rate for 1995 was TSh 500 and TSh 1000 for 1996. In Kilosa DC, the rate for 1995 and 1996
was TSh 1000, and TSh 2000 for 1997. A pena1ty of 50 percent is added if the 1evy is paid later than 1 October.
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what is actually collected. Aggregate compliance, therefore, is likely to be higher than what we
can read from the the district council's revenue fies.
The quality of the survey data was checked for accuracy soon after the return from the vilages.
The interviews were then coded and entered into the SPSS statistical programme and
subsequently converted into the SYSTAT programme for micro-computers. The statistical
analysis consisted of a step-by-step process, staring with frequencies, cross-tabulations and,
finally, model testing.
In the following section we present the results of the initial statistical analysis (the model testing
is not inc1uded in this paper). Given the richness of the data collected, we believe that the present
document wil be helpful as an input to the ongoing conceptual and methodological debate about
tax compliance and its determinants in developing countries, as well as a contribution to the
emerging debate on tax evasion in Tanzania.
4 Results
In this section we shall first provide a descriptive presentation of the characteristics of those who
pay development levy (i.e., compliers), and then focus on analysing the motivation of compliers
in terms of opportunities for tax evasion, the perceived probabilty of being detected, severity of
sanctions, perceived fairness of. the terms of trade with the government and the possible impacts
of peer groups' compliance behaviour on the individual's decisions. The possible impact of ability
to pay is also discussed.
4.1 Who pays ?
The aggregate compliance rate of the sample in Kibaha is 66 percent in L 995 and 44 percent in
1996 (see table 4.1). The respective figures for Kilosa are 80 percent and 84 percent, and 18
percent for 1997.22 The shar decline in aggregate compliance in Kibaha from 1995 to 1996 may
be related to the doubling of the development levy rate from TSh 500 to TSh 1,000 (see section
4.2.1). In Kilosa, the low compliance rate for 1997 may parly be due to the doubling of the
development levy rate from TSh 1,000 in 1996 to TSh 2,000 in 1997. However, since the
deadline for voluntar payment was not expired when the survey was caried out in Kilosa we
would expect a relatively low compliance rate for 1997 (see section 3.2). Thus, except from
indicating a possible relationship between the level of the tax rate and tax compliance, the 1997
figures can not be used to explore peoples' compliance behaviour. Therefore, we do not report the
results for L 997 in the following sections.
Important background variables characterising compliers are place of recidence (i.e., vilage),
migration, religion, occupation, wealth and age.
4.1.1 Place ofresidence and compliance
Compliance rates vary between the selected vilages (table 4.1). In Kibaha, compliance is highest
in Pangani both for 1995 and 1996 (76 percent and 55 percent, respectively). The compliance rate
is also relatively high in Mwendapole (74 percent in 1995 and 48 percent in 1996). Tax resistance
is highest in Disunyara (51 percent complied in 1995 and 35 percent in 1996). The relative
compliance rates between the surveyed vilages in Kibaha are consistent with figures from the
accounts of the vilages compiled from the ward executive officers.
22 Regarding the possibility for over-representation of compliers, and/or biased responses, see the discussion in
section 3.2.
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The figures from Kilosa also indicate differences in compliance rates between the vilages,
although we should be cautious to draw general conc1usions from the small sample, in particular,
for Dumila vil age. However, also for Chanzuru the high compliance rates c1aimed are
questionable (see section 3.1.2.2).
Table 4.1 Compliance rates of the surveyed vilages
Pangani Tumbi 33 76 55 n.a.
Misugusugu Visiga 31 68 39 n.a.
Mwendapo1e Kibaha 27 74 48 n.a.
Disunyara Mlandizi 37 51 35 n.a.
4.1.2 Migration and compliance
Migrants constitute 53 percent of the sample in Kibaha, compared to 30 percent in Kilosa. The
observed difference between the two councils in this respect probably reflects fairly well the real
situation. Due to its proximity to Dar es Salaam we would expect that a larger share of the
population in Kibaha are migrants.
The relative share of migrants differs between the selected vilages (table 4.2). In Pangani
migrants constitute 94 percent of the respondents, while the corresponding figure for Disunyara is
only L L percent. The share of migrants in the two other vilages in Kibaha lies between 50 percent
and 60 percent. In the vilages in Kilosa, migrants make up 42 percent of the sample in Chanzuru,
compared to 25 percent and 18 percent in Dumila and Mamoyo vilages, respectively.
Migrants appear to be more compliant than people born in the study areas.23 This is the case for
both Kibaha and Kilosa, although the difference in compliance rates between migrants and
non-migrants in Kilosa in 1996 is insignificant (see table 4.3).24 The observed differences in
compliance rates between vilages may, thus, be related to the share of migrants among the
respondents in the respective vilages.
23 In this paper we refer to people born in the areas, Le., the Coasta1 Region for Kibaha and Morogoro Region for
Kilosa, as "non-migrants".
24 Compliance rate is here defined as the share of respondents (of the specific group referred to) who c1aims to have
paid the levy.
12
Table 4.2 The share of Muslims and migrants in the samples
Pangani 33 39 94
Misugusugu 31 87 55
Mwendapole 27 81 59
Disunyara 37 92 11
Table 4.3 Compliance rates among migrants and people born in the area (in percent)
Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance
rate in 1995 rate in 1996 rate in 1995 rate in 1996
Migrants 72 54 92 85
Non-migrants 60 32 74 84
4.1.3 Religion and compliance
The majority of the respondents are Muslims, Le., 75 percent of the sample in Kibaha and 73
percent in Kilosa (see table 4.2). Christians constitute the large st share of migrants in Kilosa, Le.,
69 percent, compared to 41 percent in Kibaha. In Kibaha, the majority of Christians, 97 percent
(28 persons out of a sample of 29) have migrated to the area from other regions of Tanzania. In
contrast, only 39 percent (37 persons out of a sample of 96) of the Muslim respondents in Kibaha
are migrants. 75 percent of the Christians in the Kilosa sample were migrants, compared to only
13 percent of the Muslims.
Comparing the two dominant religious groups,. Christians in Kibaha appear to be more compliant
than Muslims in both years (see table 4.4). In Kilosa, we find only minor differences between the
compliance rates of Muslims and Christians.
The observed differences between Muslims and Christians may indicate that cultural differences,
including religion, matter with respect to tax compliance. However, compliance rates of Muslim
migrants and Christian migrants differ less than the compliance rates of Muslims and Christians
as aggregated groups. In 1996, 51 percent of the compliant Muslims in Kibaha were migrants,
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while the corresponding figure for 1995 was 42 percent.25 These figures indicate that migrants, in
general, independently of religion, are more compliant than non-migrants. We do not find
significant differences between Muslims and Christians with respect to other variables.
Table 4.4 Religion and compliance (in percent)
Kibaha:
Christians 23 79 59 97
Muslims 75 63 39 39
Other 2 50 50 100
Kilosa:
Christians 27 83 83 75
Muslims 73 78 84 13
4.1.4 Occupation and compliance
We find only small differences between the three rural vilages in Kibaha (Pangani, Misugusugu
and Disunyara) with respect to principal income sources (table 4.5). However, in the rural-urban
vilage, Mwendapole, agriculture is, as expected, a relatively less important income source, while
self-employment (other) is more important than in the other vilages. In Kilosa, the majority of
the respondents were agriculturalists (41 respondents of a total of 44), only two were traders (both
were from Chanzuru vilage), and one was a wage employee in the private sector (from Mamoyo
vilage ).26
Table 4.5 Principal source ofincome in the households in Kibaha (in percent)
Agriculture 85 77 59 89
Self-employed O 3 4 O
trade
and commerce
Self-employed 12 19 26 8
other
Wage-employee O O 4 3
private sector
Wage-employee O O 7 O
public sector
Total* 100 (33) 100 (31) ioa (27) 100 (37)
*The figures in brackets refer to the number of respondents.
25 As shown in table 4.4, 39 percent of the Muslim respondents are migrants.
26 See the discussion in section 3.1.2.2 on how the sample was selected.
14
The relationship between compliance and occupation is presented in table 4.6. For 1995 and
L 996, the highest compliance rate is found in households with wage-employees in the public
sector. This is the case for both Kibaha and Kilosa. The compliance rate for self-employed in
trade and commerce is also relatively high. In Kilosa, the compliance rate is surprisingly high
among wage employees in the private sector, compared to Kibaha. Further, a general pattern
found (not reported in the tables) is that households with more than one income earner are more
compliant than households with only one income earner. Thus, income (ability to pay) may be an
important background variable.
Table 4.6 Main occupation ofincome earners in the household and compliance,
Kibaha and Kilosa (Kilosa in brackets)
Agriculture 123 (43) 67 (79) 44 (84)
Self-emp1oyed, 9 (21) 89 (86) 56 (86)
trade and commerce
Self-employed, 49 (9) 65 (89) 37 (78)
other
Wage-employee, 5 (13) 20 (100) 20 (100)
private sec tor
Wage-employee, 5 (1) 100 (100) 100 (100)
public sector
*The number of persons in each category is diferent from the number of respondents, since there
may be several income earners in each respondents household.
The main differences between non-migrants and migrants with respect to occupation are
presented in table 4.7.
Table 4.7 Migration and occupation, Kibaha and Kilosa
(in percent, figures for Kilosa in brackets)
Agriculture 47 (72) 53 (28)
Self-employed 67 (67) 33 (33)
trade/commerce
Self-employed 51 (67) 49 (33)
other
Wage-emp1oyee 40 (67) 60 (33)
private sector
Wage-employee 20 (O) 80 (100)
public sector
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In both Kibaha and Kilosa, the majority of the public sector wage employees are migrants.
However, a larger share of the wage-employees in the private sector in Kibaha are migrants (60
percent), compared to Kilosa (33 percent). In contrast, and for both districts, two thirds (67
percent) of the self-employed in trade and commerce are non-migrants. The share of migrants
employed in agriculture seems to reflect the relative share of migrants in each sample.
4.1.5 Wealth and compliance
Three of the selected wealth indicators seem to have explanatory power in Kibaha: Radio and
wristwatch ownership and iron sheeted roof (the other "house-standard indicators" don't seem to
be of importance in this respect).27 The compliance rate of respondents who live in houses with
corrugated iron-sheeted roofs is higher than average, I.e., 74 percent in 1995 and 56 percent in
1996 (not inc1uded in table 4.8). A larger share of the migrants compared to non-migrants have
iron-sheeted roofs on the houses they live in (out of the total sample, 63 percent of those with iron
sheeted roofs are migrants). Further, a larger share of the migrants (64 percent) own wristwatches
compared to non-migrants (22 percent). We do, however, observe only minor differences in the
compliance rates of house-owners and renters. Not unexpectedly, a smaller share of migrants (79
percent) own the houses they live in compared to non-migrants (95 percent). As for houseowners
and renters in general, we find only small differences between migrants owning houses and
migrants renting houses with respect to compliance behaviour.
Table 4.8 Assets and compliance, Kibaha and Kilosa
(in percent, Kilosa in brackets)
Radio
Bicyc1e
Wristwatch
70 (81)
62 (90)
69 (93)
52 (33)
70 (50)
58 (73)
49 (85)
44 (90)
65 (79)
24 (100)
43 (67)
38 (87)
In Kilosa, owners of wristwatches and radios are (or c1aim to be) more compliant that those
not-owning these durables in 1995, while the opposite is the case for 1996. Respondents owning
bicyc1es are, however, significantly more compliant than those not owning this asset. Further, we
observe that a larger share of migrants (85 percent) compared non-migrants (67 percent) own
bicyc1es.28 We also find that a larger share of migrants compared to non-migrants possess
wristwatches and live in houses with iron-sheeted roofs.
A larger share of migrants compared to non-migrants seems to possess the specified durables.
This is the case for both Kibaha and Kilosa, and indicates that migrants, in general, are more
wealthy than non-migrants.
27 According to the National CornellÆRB 1991 survey (see World Bank, 1993:41), radios and watches are the two
durables whose ownership is most c1ose1y connected with poverty in households in Tanzania. See the discussion
in section 3.1.1.
28 The greater importance of bicyc1es as an indicator of wea1th in Kilosa compared to Kibaha is consistent with aur
observations during the fie1d studies. However, in the National CornellÆRB 1991-survey on households'
consumption and paverty a positive correlation between the ownership of bicyc1es and inc 
ame is not found
(World Bank, 1993:41)
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4.1.6 Age and compliance
Regarding the possible relationship between age and compliance, we find that compliance is
lowest for the youngest age group (i.e., between 18 and 29 years). The age groups between 30 and
49 years and between 50 and 59 years appear to be the most compliant ones. In Kilosa, however,
respondents above the age of 60 appear to be the most compliant on es in 1995 (see table 4.9).29
The small number of respondents within the age groups below 30 and above 50 in Kilosa, makes
generalisations on the basis of age questionable.
Table 4.9 Age and compliance, Kibaha and Kilosa
(Kilosa in brackets)
18-29
30-49
50-59
60-
19 (7)
54 (27)
16 (6)
36 (4)
53 (29)
76 (85)
75 (100)
62 (100)
21 (57)
54 (92)
47 (100)
38 (50)
4.2 Why people pay
Three of the five hypothesised relationships are lent some support by the analysis. Tax
compliance seems to be positively related to abilty to pay, opportunities for tax evasion, the
(perceived) probability of being prosecuted, and the number of tax evaders known personally by
the respondent. No positive relationships were found between tax compliance and the perceived
severity of sanctions against defaulters and the perceived terms of trade with the government. In
contrast, we find that severe sanctions (e.g., strict enforcement and harassment of taxpayers), and
discontent with what people feel they get in return from the government may increase tax
resistance, and, thus, contribute to explain the widespread tax evasion observed.
4.2.1. Ability to pay
A general observation from the surveys is that the better-off respondents seem to be most
compliant. For instance, households with more than one income earner are, in general, more
compliant than households with only one income earner (section 4.1.4). We also find that the
relatively better-off migrants seem to be more compliant than people born in the survey areas
(section 4.1.5). Further, the relationship between age and compliance may also be related to
ability to pay. The youngest age group (i.e., 18-29) is the less wealthy one measured in durable
assets (section 4.1.6).
As noted above (section 4.1), the sharp increase in admitted non-compliance in Kibaha from 1995
to 1996, and in Kilosa from L 996 to 1997, may indicate that higher taxes have led to larger
compliance problems (see table 4.1). The respondents' views on the tax rate may also provide an
indication on the importance of ability to pay. 89 percent of the respondents in Kilosa consider
the development levy rate to be too high, while only 11 percent consider it to be reasonable. The
29 Regarding the background variable "age", there is a bias in our samp1e. In Mwendapole vil age only one
respondent is be10w the age of 30. Since this age group is the less compliant, this may contribute to explain the
higher compliance in this vilage (see table 4.1).
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corresponding figures for Kibaha are 5 L percent and 44 percent.30 ane should here take into
consideration that the present development levy rate in Kilosa is twice as high as in Kibaha.
These responses indicate that ability to pay is an important background variable in explaining
compliance. However, establishing a link between abilty to pay and compliance does not show
which way causation flows. Is tax resistance lower among the better-off, or are these people more
directly targeted by tax enforcers? In the following section we discuss this question.
4.2.2 Probability of being prosecuted
The observed differences in compliance between occupations are parly due to different
opportunities to evade and partly due to differences in the probabilities of being prosecuted (see
section 4.1.4). The highest compliance rate (lOa percent) is found among wage earners in the
public sector (see table 4.5). Since development levy is withheld from their salaries, these persons
have no opportunity to evade the levy. The relatively low compliance rates of agriculturists in
Kibaha (67 percent in 1995 and 44 percent in 1996) and self-employed, other (i.e., carpenters,
charcoal makers, etc.) (65 percent in 1995 and 37 percent in 1996) are consistent with findings
from Western countries, which reveal that admitted tax evasion is relatively high among the
self-employed (e.g., Mason and Lowrey, 1981).31 Thus, the relatively high compliance rate of
self-employed in trade and commerce may seem surprising (table 4.5). However, several factors
may contribute to explain this observation:
During tax campaigns many taxpayers "hide in the bushli.32 These campaigns are organised by the
Ward Executive Officers accompanied by the local militia. In Kibaha, the Vilage Executive
Dfficer also participates. In principle, tax campaigns are organised when the deadline for paying
has expired, i.e., i October. . Before this date, and according to by-laws, payment is considered to
be "voluntary". However, tax campaigns seem to be an ongoing affair throughout the year.33 It is
reasonable to assume that the opportunity costs of hiding from tax enforcers are higher for the
more wealthy people compared to poorer households. Thus, we may expect that relatively
better-off persons put less effort into hiding, and that they, therefore, are more easily targeted by
tax enforcers. We may, further assume that the marginal utility of a shiling saved byevading
taxes is higher for the poorer households than for the better-off. This may also induce poorer
households to hide during tax campaigns. Given limited administrative resources, efforts by tax
collectors to maximise yields from scarce enforcement resources may lead them to concentrate on
the most accessible and better-off taxpayers. When tax enforcement priorities are made we would,
therefore, expect that ability to pay and accessibility are key variables. Such mechanisms, in
addition to factors related to opportunity for evasion, could well explain the relatively high
compliance rate of self-employed in trade and commerce. In principle, shop-owners need a
development levy card (a receipt) to get a business licence. Their opportunities to evade are
thereby reduced. In addition, we would expect that even if they had the opportunity, their
30 We may of course question the re1evance of comparing the two councils with respect to tax rates. However,
according to World Bank (1993:29) the poverty profil es in Coasta1 Region (incl. Kibaha De) and Morogoro
Region (inlc. Kilosa De) are fairly similar. This observation is based on a comparison of farming environments in
different regions, since agriculture is the main economic activity in rural areas. Thus, assuming that the survey
sarp1es fairly well reflect the structure of the taxable population in the two areas, it is probably relevant to
comparing peoples' perceptions on tax rates.
31 The number of se1f-employed and wage emp10yees in the samp1es is Telatively small. Therefore, these results
shou1d only be considered as indicative. However, our tentative results are consistent with survey studies caried
out in Western countries which report opportunities to evade to be an important explanatory factor behind
compliance behaviour (Slemrod, 1985; Witte and Woodbury, 1985). Experimenta1 studies also suggest that
opportunity for tax evasion does have a causal role (Robben et aL., 1991).
32 This information was provided by tax collectors interviewed in Kibaha and Kilosa.
33 In particular, this is the case in Kilosa where the ward leve1 is in charge of tax collection (Fjeldstad and Semboja,
1998).
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opportunity costs of hiding from tax enforcers are relatively high compared to people in other
occupations, say agriculture. Further, respondents in this occupation are relatively better-off, as
reflected by the selected wealth indicators, than respondents in other occupations.
The factors discussedabovemay also contribute to explain differences in the compliance rates of
vilages (see table 4.1). According to the wealth indicators, people in Mwendapole vilage are
better-off than people in the other vilages. This observation is not surprising due to the location
of the vil age by the main road and other structural characteristics (Le., being a rural-urban
vilage). More trading and easier access to markets may arguably to contribute to greater wealth.
For instance, a larger share of the respondents in Mwendapole (93 percent) own radios compared
to only 77 percent in Pangani. A similar pattern is found with respect to the other wealth
indicators (wristwatches and iron-sheeted roofs). Wealth, reflecting ability to pay, may, therefore,
be an important background variable in explaining compliance in this vilage. In addition,
Mwendapole is more easily accessible than the other vilages. These factors contribute to ease tax
collection and make it an easier target for tax enforeement compared to the other vilages. Thus,
in Mwendapole, both the actual (Le, real) probability as well as taxpayers' perceived probability
of being prosecuted is likely to be higher than in the other vilages.
In Pangani vilage, which is the most compliant vilage in Kibaha, two factors, partly different
from those observed in Mwendapole, support the assumption that coercion influences compliance
behaviour. First, the relatively high compliance rate may have to do with more efficient
enforcement compared to the situation in the other vilages (see table 4.1). The Vilage Executive
Officer (VEO) in Pangani was recruited in August 1995, and revenue collection improved
significantly since he took over.34 The relatively small size of this vilage also contributes to make
tax compliance more transparent, and may, therefore, make it easier to target non-compliers.35
Second, a larger share of the respondents in Pangani are migrants who, in general, are more
compliant than non-migrants.
Why are migrants more compliant than people born in the survey areas? Three factors may
contribute in explaining this observation, which all support the hypothesis that tax enforcement
and taxpayers' perceived probability of being prosecuted are important. First, migrants, in general,
seem to be better-off than people born in the area. We may, therefore, expect that tax collectors,
maximising yields from scarce enforcement resources, enforce taxes more firmly on the perceived
more wealthy migrants. The importance of ability to pay as a background variable is supported by
the finding that a larger share of migrants in Kibaha con siders the tax rate to be reasonable
compared to non-migrants.36
Second, migrants seem (not unexpectedly) to be less integrated and have looser relations to local
authorities, inc1uding tax collectors, than people born in the area (non-migrants). Thus, we may
expect that it is easier, and probably more convenient, for tax enforcers to target migrants rather
than targeting people from the area who might be their relatives, neighbours or who are related to
local politicians and authorities. This argument is supported by the observation that a larger share
of migrants (46 percent in Kibaha and 3 L percent in Kilosa) compared to non-migrants (33
percent and 16 percent, respectively, for Kibaha and Kilosa) said they knew no one not paying.
34 This observation do es also support the possible importance of establishing arm'slength re1ationships between
taxpayers and collectors with respect to tax enforcement.
35 The importance of more efficient tax enforcement in Pangani is supported by the observation that a larger share of
the respondents in Pangani, compared to the other vilages, said they pay the 1evy directly to the VEO.
36 In Kilosa we don't observe significant differences between groups in this respect. There seems to be a general
resentment among the public about the doubling of the levy rate from 1996 to 1997. Generally, about 90 percent
of the respondents in Kilosa consider the rate to be too high.
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This may indicate a lack of integrity in the tax collectors' relationship with taxpayers.37 This effect
implies that the real probability of being prosecuted probably is higher for migrants compared to
non-migrants. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that the number of tax evaders observed,
have impacts on the individual taxpayer's perceived probabilty of being prosecuted: The smaller
the fraction of the localpopulation that is known to be not paying, the more likely the individual
may perceive his risk of being prosecuted (see the discussion in section 4.2.4). Thus, a migrants
perceived probability of being prosecuted may be higher than that perceived by a person born in
the area. In Kibaha, this proposition is supported by the finding that a larger share of the migrants
(25 percent) compared to non-migrants (8 percent) consider lack of opportunity for evasion to be
the main reason why some people pay the levy, or, alternatively, they perceive the probability of
being prosecuted to be higher than non-migrants.
Direct targeting by collectors, however, requires that the collectors are familar with the
taxpayers, knowing who is who, background, ability to pay, etc.. This is the case in Kibaha where
tax collection is carried out by the Vilage Executive Offcer, who lives in the vil age and is
nominated to his position by the Vilage Council.38 However, in the vilages surveyed in Kilosa
tax collection is carried out by the ward leveL. The revenue collectors are nominated by the
district level, and are often transferred to the ward by the district management. They are,
therefore, in general not vilagers per se. Thus, we may expect that the Ward Executive Officers
and Ward Revenue Collectors have less detailed knowledge than the VEOs on the background of
and ability to pay of the individual taxpayers. This may indicate that targeting is less relevant in
Kilosa. However, in Kilosa too we find that the better-off, including migrants, are more compliant
than others, which indicates that some kind of targeting, is still relevant. For instance, we fin d that
respondents owning bicycles are more compliant than others (see table 4.8). According to the
WEOs interviewed in Kilosa, roadblocks are frequently used to enforce taxes. People passing
these roadblocks are required to show their receipts or to pay the levy. In addition, Kilosa DC has
imposed a bicycle tax which is to be paid on an annual basis.39 Since bicycles are frequently used
to transport goods to and from markets, it is often inconvenient for the users to find alternative
routes through the bush to avoid the roadblocks. The ward collectors and the local militia also
make use of bicycles. Thus, if someone is observed trying to avoid the roadblock they may be
chased. By using roadblocks and thereby also targeting cyclists, tax collectors manage to enforce
two types of local taxes. The inconvenience experienced when passing a roadblock without a
development levy receipt and a bicycle sticker may also induce "bikers" to pay "voluntarily".
These arguments are supported by peoples' respons e to the question "why do you think some
people pay taxes?". As many as 31 percent of the respondents in Kilosa answered "to avoid
disturbances" . 40
The third factor which may induce migrants to comply is based on the general observation that
migrants, generally, maintain their relations with (and obligations towards) the family at their
home-place. In a study from Kenya, Smoke (1994:39) reports that "(flamiles of migrants remain
in their "home" area of origin, and the migrants visit "home" frequently, fully intending to return
there to settle down after accumulating some desired level of resources". This probably describes
fairly well the adaptation of migrants in Tanzania, too. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
migrants travel more, visiting their familes, compared to non-migrants. Anecdotal evidence
37 Tanzi (1995) us es the term "lack of arm's length relationship" to describe this situation.
38 The position of the Vilage Executive Officer is a continuation of the previous position of CCM secretary which
was abolished when the multiparty system was introduced in 1995.
39 For 1997 the bicyc1e tax in Kilosa is TSh 1,000. The estimated number of bicyc1es in the council are 13,718.
When the bicyc1e tax is paid a receipt in the form of a sticker to be attached to the bike is provided. This system is
similar to the "car stickers" used as a receipt for various car-re1ated taxes paid in many Western countries.
40 The corresponding figure for Kibaha is 10 percent. However, this option was not inc1uded in the Kibaha
questionnaire. Thus, the importance of this option is probably high1y underestimated in Kibaha.
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shows that the police often controls travellers, in particular, bus passengers, at road checkpoints
and requires to see their development levy receipts (Tripp, 1997; and Bukurura, 1991). We may,
therefore, expect that the probabilty of being controlled and prosecuted for persons who travel
frequently is higher compared to people who travel less.41 To avoid police harassment and
inconvenience migrants may therefore decide to "voluntarily" pay the levy.42 This argument is
consistent with the observation that people in Pangani vilage in Kibaha, where migrants
constitute the majority of the respondents, are more compliant than people in other vilages (see
section 4.1. l). It is also consistent with the observation that people self-employed in trade and
commerce - whom we may also expect travel relatively of ten - are more compliant than people in
other occupations in the private sector (see section 4.1.4).43
How do we explain the poor compliance of the oldest age group in the Kibaha sample (see
section 4.1.6, table 4.9)? This observation diverges from information received during the survey
that elderly people in general were expected to be more compliant than younger ones, due to the
stigma costs and embarrassment associated with being brought to court for not paying. It diverges
also from surveys carried out in Western countries which find that increasing age appears to be
related to lower tax resistance (see, e.g., Spicer et aL., 1976). aur res ult may either suggest poor
measurement or a failure to include other important variables. However, it does support the result
that income and wealth are important background variables when explaining compliance. Elderly
people often have low ability to pay, representing small and less affuent households. Thus, we
may expect that the marginal utility of evading one shiling is higher for these people compared to
better-off peop1e, and, further, that the opportunity costs of hiding from tax collectors are less.
The same set of arguments is probably relevant when explaining compliance behaviour of
younger people, i.e., the age group below 30 years (see table 4.9). However, given the traditional
respect for elders in African societies, we may also expect that tax enforcement is less strict on
elderly people.
4.2.3 Perceptions on the severity of sanctions
Anticipated positive relationships between compliance and the perceived severity of sanctions
against defaulters are not supported. An important background variable here is personal
experience with and observation of others' experiences with tax enforcement at the vil age and
ward leveIs. Thus, a tax:payer's observation of how many others are being brought to court and
prosecuted during tax campaigns may be used as an indicator of the severity of sanctions against
defaulters.
We find only small differences between the views of compliers and non-compliers on this issue.
The most significant pattern found in Kibaha is the different experiences of migrants and
non-migrants. 34 percent of the migrants answered that they (or someone they knew personally)
had never been contacted by the tax collector to pay tax with penalty, w hile only 13 percent of the
respondents born in the area gave this answer. The corresponding figures for Kilosa are 23 and 26
percent, respectively. 66 percent of the migrants in Kibaha said they had been contacted one or
more times, compared to 83 percent of the non-migrants. In Kilosa, we found only minor
differences between migrants and non-migrants on this issue (75 percent versus 77 percent).
Regarding the question whether they personally knew someone who had been convicted for not
paying, 68 percent of the migrants in Kibaha answered no one, compared to 47 percent of the
non-migrants. The corresponding figures for Kilosa were 77 percent and 68 percent, respectively.
41 Probability refers here to both perceived and real probabilty.
42 This is comparab1e to the discussion above on explaining the relatively high compliance of cyclists in Kilosa.
43 Controlling for origin of birth, on1y one third of the traders in the two samples are migrants. This supports the
arguments above on a correlation between travel frequency and compliance.
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Regarding the question about the reaction of the council or ward to people who didn't pay, 15
percent of the migrants in Kibaha said "no reaction", while none of the non-migrants gave this
answer. 57 percent of the migrants said they "have to pay tax plus penalty" , compared to 75
percent of the non-migrants gave this answer.
In general, non-compliers in Kilosa seem to be more discontented with tax collectors than
compliers (see table 4.10). People born in the area also seem to be more dissatisfied. We observe
only minor differences between the perceptions of these groups in Kibaha.
Table 4.10 The respondents' views oftax collectors in Kibaha and Kilosa
(in percent, figuresfor Kilosa in brackets)
Total sample 15 (21) 14 (2)
Migrants 15 (8) 13 (O)
Non-migrants 15 (26) 15 (3)
Compliers, 1995 14 (15) 13 (3)
Non-compliers, 1995 17 (44) 15 (O)
Compliers, 1996 18 (19) 13 (3)
Non-compliers, 1996 13 (28) 15 (O)
* By "don't do as best they can" is meant laxity.
How do we interpret these responses ? From the standard theory we would expect that the more
severe the sanctions perceived by taxpayers, the higher the compliance.44 The survey results seem
to point in the opposite direction: The more severe the sanctions observed, the more widespread
the tax resistance. The reason for this "perverse" relationship is not entirely clear, however, it may
be due to reciprocity considerations.45 The reciprocity argument leads to the proposition that tax
authorities' unresponsive, corrupt, disrespectful, and unfair treatment of taxpayers foster
disrespect for and resistance against tax authorities and tax laws - also a kind of reciprocation in
kind.46
The strength of the possible direct reciprocity effects on compliance of tax enforcement
procedures probably depends on how much personal experience taxpayers have had with the tax
44 The respons es do, however, support the assumption that migrants are less integrated in the vilage society, and,
therefore, observe less enforcement (see the discussion in section 4.2.1).
45 One of the strongest socio-psychological reasons for expecting that positive behaviour by administrators towards
taxpayers wil increase the likelihood of compliance is the strong tendency for humans to try to reciprocate, in
kind, behaviour toward them (e.g., Smith, 1992; Ciaidani, 1989; and Sugden, 1984). Sugden (1984) refers to the
respons e of reciprocating behaviour as a "cross-societal norm of reciprocity: a norm both in the sense of a
universal regularity and a moral responsibility". Much research across a wide range of applied areas demonstrates
that reciprocation is a powerful made of persuasion. Axelrod (1984), for instance, in two computer simulations
demonstrated that the reciprocity rule was better than more comp1ex punitive ru1es at obtaining cooperation from
the other p1ayer. The reciprocity norm evokes an obligation for individuals to make a concession to someone who
has made a concession to them. Strumpe1 (1969), in a multinational study of tax compliance, argues that
enforcement techniques emphasising detection and punishment may have an indirect, negative effect by alienating
taxpayers and lowering their wilingness to comply vo1untarily. Lower wilingness to comply may lead to active
efforts to evade taxes, as well as to other forms of tax resistance.
46 This proposition can also be stated in positve terms: Tax authorities responsive, honest, respectful and fair
treatment of taxpayers tends to foster respect for and cooperation with the tax system (Smith, 1992:227).
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authorities. Those who have had significant personal contacts, for instance by bein g brought to
court by the local militia, may reciprocate on the basis of resentment (Le., tit-for-tat) while also
developing a more generalised normative response. Those who have not had much personal
contact may develop their perceptions on how tax authorities treat taxpayers from what they know
about the experiences ofothers and from their more general concepts of the tax system and of
how government officials treat citizens. Because these perceptions are typically less specific than
are personal experiences, their effects on compliance are likely to be primarily indirect ones
through generalised normative commitments and loyalty.
Jf the proposition on reciprocity is correct, it may contribute to explain the widespread
non-compliance observed in the survey area:47 Harsh enforcement of development levy and
harassment by collectors may induce tax evasion. Tax evasion may then be interpreted as a
strategy of public resistance and opposition against the authorities.48 Thus, it may be reasonable to
suppose that suffering the penalties and inconvenience of a prosecution (being brought to court by
the local militia, etc.), wil increase tax resistance. However, this proposition should on ly be
considered as tentative. Further studies are needed to test its robustness. Harsh tax enforcement
is, however, considered to be a problem in many councils, not least by politicians. During election
campaigns both local and central government politicians usually deliver the message that tax
collectors should not harass taxpayers (Bukurura, 1991; Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998).
4.2.4 Terms of trade with the government (fiscal exchange)
The hypothesis concerning a positive relationship between tax compliance and the use of tax
revenues, Le., the perceived fairness of the terms of trade with the government, is not supported.
However, although taxpayers' perceptions of an unfair contract with the government do not
appear to explain why some people pay, they may explain why many don't. A major problem
perceived by taxpayers is that they see few tangible benefits in return for the taxes they pay.49 The
respondents' perceptions of the quality of public services are very similar in Kilosa and Kibaha
(see table 4.11). However, dissatisfaction seems to be highest in Kilosa where 75 percent of the
respondents consider the quality to be bad (compared to 66 percent in Kibaha), and 25 percent
consider them to be average (compared to 26 percent in Kibaha). None of the respondents in
Kilosa consider the public services to be good (compared to 6 percent in Kibaha).50 77 percent of
the respondents in Kilosa say the quality of services today is worse than three years ago
(compared to 66 percent in Kibaha).
47 Widespread non-compliance with respect to development levy seems to characterise the situation in most councils
in Tanzania (see section 1).
48 This interpretation is supported by Tripp (1997) who focuses on the behaviour of people in the informal sector
Dar es Salaam. Tax resistance may sometimes also take more violent forms. In Kilosa we were informed about tax
collectors being attacked by the public. Recently one collector had been seriously wounded after being hit in the
head with a panga (a large chopping knife used by peasants) when he approached an assumed tax defaulter. In
1996 the ward office in Chanzuru was destroyed during night and the Tax Register Books were burnt. We were
told that certain vilages in Kilosa were avoided by collectors, and some were only visited by collectors
accompanied by the loca1 miltia. Similar cases are reported from other counci1s, too. Daily News (28 November,
1997:5) reports that "(olver twenty Moshi Municipa1 Council workers who were on a special operation to net
development levy defaulters were attacked by a mob at Mbuyuni Market on Wednesday afternoon and eight of
them were injured, some seriously, it was learned yesterday."
49 Taxpayers' views are here supported by the tax collectors (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 1998).
50 The respons 
e from people in Kilosa is interesting considering the 10ng-term involvement of international
development aid agencies in the area, in contrast to Kibaha. For instance, the main roads in Kilosa have a fairly
good standard due to donor funding. Further, donors are involved in the education and health sectors. However,
people do seem to be well aware about who is responsible for the different services, and di stingu is hes between
"council services" and "donor provided services" . Thus, the main roads are referred to as "Irish roads" and the
almost non-passable feeder roads are named council roads. Donors' presence in Kilosa may have contributed to
revea1 the poor standard of loca1 services for the constituents.
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Table 4.11 Perceptions on the quality ofpublic services
(in percent of total number ofrespondents)
Good 6 O
Average 26 25
Bad 66 75
Don't know 2 O
In Kibaha, 83 percent of the respondents answer that in their view development levy is "only
parIy" or "not at all" used to provide public services. The corresponding figure for Kilosa is 88
percent (the majority, i.e., 70 percent, answer "not at all"). There are only minor differences
between compliers and non-compliers in this respect. However, we observe certain differences
between the perceptions of migrants and non-migrants. In Kibaha, 84 percent of the migrants and
65 percent of non-migrants consider development levy only partly or not at all to be used to
provide services. In Kilosa, 69 percent of the migrants compared to 96 percent of the
non-migrants give this response.
Regarding the respondents' perceptions on the major problems with tax collection, we observe
only minor differences between compliers and non-compliers. However, the views of migrants
and non-migrants seem to differ on this issue too (see table 4.12). In Kibaha, the major problem is
considered to be that taxes are not spent on public services (55 percent of the respondents). 62
percent of the migrants consider this to be the major problem, compared to 47 percent of the
non-migrants. In Kilosa, however, the majority (46 percent of the sample) considers the high tax
rates to be the major problem, and the second most important problem to be that taxes are not
being used to provide services (23 percent of the respondents). This response in Kilosa most
likely reflects the frustration among the constituents that the development levy rate was doubled
in 1997, and does not necessarily contradict the general dissatisfaction with public services
reflected in table 4. L L (see section 4.2. 1).51
Table 4.12 The most important problems with respect to tax collection,
Kibaha and Kilosa (in percent, Kilosa in brackets)
Toa high rates 12 (46) 18 (48) 6 (40)
Taxpayers are 17 (13) 17 (10) 18 (20)
unwiling to pay
Taxes are not spent 55 (23) 47 (21) 62 (30)
on public services
Other 16 (18) 18 (20) 14 (10)
Sl The dissatisfaction among the respondents in Kilosa with the high tax rate is reflected in peoples' pereeptions of
loeal politicians whom they consider to be responsib1e for proposing increased rates. 66 percent of the
respondents say that local po1iticians "do not do as best they can", 1 1 percent consider them to be "dishonest" , and
on ly 14 percent say they "do as best they ean". The corresponding figures for Kibaha are 43 percent, 11 pereent,
and 44 pereent.
24
Two observations seem evident. First, there is a widespread discontent among people regarding
their terms of trade with the government. More than 60 percent of the respondents in Kilosa agree
with people saying that all taxpayers would cheat to some extent if they thought they could get
away with it. The corresponding figure for Kibaha is 55 percent. Peoples' tax resistance is
correlated to deteriorating or, in some cases, non-existent public services. This argument is
supported by other studies. Bukurura (1991:91) refers to an investigation from 1987 by the
Tanzania News Agency in Kigoma Town Council, which reported that "many people were
defaulting apparently because they thought the council was not doing its best to serve the
residents". Tripp (1997:233) refers to an article in Daily News (from 9 lune 1985) in which she
quotes a typical comment by a Dar es Salaam resident: "When it comes to Development Levy we
have .... seen nothing as a res ult of the levy we pay..... the city is very dirty and the situation is
deteriorating day in and out.... What we want to see is how such taxes are being spent."
Second, migrants seem to be more dissatisfied than non-migrants.52 The reason for this
relationship is not obvious. However, migrants may have greater expectations on improved living
conditions when moving. When not experiencing improvements, their disappointment and
frustration may possibly be reflected in their perceptions of the authorities, including their views
of the quality of public services. As discussed in previous sections, migrants are generally more
compliant, something which may add to their frustration since they see little in return from what
they pay in taxes.
Table 4.13 Agree with people who say they wil not pay taxes until they get
better services in returnfrom the Council (in percent, Kilosa in brackets)
Agree
Neither-nor
Disagree
30 (55)
2 (2)
68 (43)
28 (58)
O (O)
72 (42)
32 (46)
3 (8)
65 (46)
When asking people if they "agree with people saying that they wil not pay taxes until they get
better services in return from the Council", surprisingly many disagreed (68 percent of the
respondents in Kibaha and 43 percent in Kilosa, see table 4.13). The difference between the two
councils may reflect greater dissatisfaction with public services in Kilosa (see note 49). This
response may also seem contradictory to the findings discussed above. However, it may also
indicate that many people do in fact understand the relationship between taxes and public
services. One respondent used the metaphor that one "can't build a house without first buying
concrete". Further, a majority of the respondents (more than 90 percent) said they would be
wiling to pay more taxes if services were improved, although some expressed the reservation that
it depended on their abilty to pay (see table 4.14).53 These results therefore seem to deviate from
other studies, including Tax Commssion (1991) and Bukurura (1991), which claim that people in
Tanzania lack a basic understanding of their duty to pay taxes.
52 This is most evident for Kibaha. However, the responses reported in table 4.12 point in the same direction for
Kilosa.
53 This response is consistent with studies from other countries which show that even poor people are wiling to pay
something for services they va1ue, for examp1e, education (Bird, 1990:407). Bird adds that people also value more
those things for which they have to pay.
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Table 4.14 Wiling to pay more taxes if public services are improved,
Kibaha and Kilosa (in percent, Kilosa in brackets)
Yes
No
Don't know
91 (95)
10 (5)
1 (O)
90 (97)
8 (3)
2 (O)
93 (92)
7 (8)
O (O)
4.2.5 The element of social influences
The analysis of the survey results lends some support to the hypothesis concerning the impacts of
others' behaviour on the individual taxpayer's compliance decision. The number of tax evaders
known to a given taxpayer may impact on his tax compliance behaviour by influencing his
perceived probability of being detected (see section 4.2.2). A larger share of compliers compared
to non-compliers in Kilosa say they don't know anyone not paying (see table 4.16). In Kibaha, we
observe only minor differences between compliers and non-compliers on this issue. However, in
both surveys we find significant differences between migrants and non-migrants in this respect.
While 84 percent of the non-migrants in the sample from Kilosa say they know one or more
persons not paying, 62 percent of the migrants give this answer. The corresponding figures from
Kibaha are 65 percent and 54 percent. Correspondingly, we find that a larger share of the
migrants compared to non-migrants in both councils claim that they don't know anyone not
paying. This observation supports the assumption that migrants are less integrated in the vilage
society, and, thus, have less knowledge of the behaviour of others. Observations of others'
behaviour may, thus, impact on the individual's perceived probability of being prosecuted: The
larger the fraction of the local population that is observed not paying, the lesser the perceived risk
of bein g prosecuted. This may contribute to explain why migrants, in general, are more compliant
than non-migrants. Since migrants may know of fewer tax evaders than non-migrants, this may
imply that on average a migrant's perceived probabilty of being prosecuted is higher than the
perceived probability of a non-migrant.
Table 4.15 Knowing someone not paying
(in percent, Kilosa in brackets)
Total sample 40 (20) 59 (77)
Migrants 46 (31) 54 (62)
Non-migrants 33 (16) 65 (84)
Compliers, 1995 41 (23) 59 (74)
Non-compliers, 1995 41 (11) 59 (89)
Compliers, 1996 36 (22) 64 (76)
Non-compliers, 1996 43 (14) 56 (86)
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5 Summary and conclusions
In this study we have attempted to use original survey data to shed light on some of the factors
underlying tax compliance in local authorities in Tanzania. Acknowledging the obvious
weaknessesof thisessentially exploratory study, the survey data indicates that the following
factors contribute to explain compliance and non-compliance behaviour:
(1) Opportunities: Differences in opportunities for evasion matter; employees paying their taxes
through a tax withholding system have lesser opportunities to evade than the self-employed.
(2) Ability to pay: Respondents that are relatively better-off in termsofdurable assets are more
compliant due to (i) higher opportunity costs connected with evasion, and because (ii) they are
easier targeted by tax collectors. Theopportunity Gostsofhiding from tax collectors are higher for
the better-off, since hiding "puts one out of business". Thus, we may expect that relatively
better-off persons put less effort into hiding, and, therefore, are more accessible to tax enforcers.
We find, for instance, that respondents who have migrated to the area from other regions in
Tanzania are relatively more compliant than respondents who are born in the area, and that
migrants, in general, seem to be wealthier than people from the area. This result further implies
that development levy is a less regressive tax than what is usually claimed (see e.g., Tax
Commission, 1991).
(3) Coercion: Migrants seem (not unexpectedly) to be less integrated and have looser relations to
local authorities, including tax collectors, than people born in the area. Thus, it is easier, and
probably more convenient, for the tax enforcer at the vilage leve1 (i.e., the Vil age Executive
Officer), who lives in the vilage and is nominated to his position by the Vil age Council, to target
migrants rather than people from the area who might be his relatives, neighbours or who are
related to local politicians and authorities. This indicates a lack of integrity in the tax enforcers'
relationship with taxpayers, and implies that the probabilty of being prosecuted most likely is
higher for migrants.
The background variables "wealth" (as an indirect indicator of income, i.e., ability to pay) and
"migration" also seem to influence the probability of prosecution through their impacts on tax
collectors' decisions. Given limited administrative resources, when deciding on how and whom to
target, it appears rational for collectors to concentrate on the easiest accessible and better-off
taxpayers. When tax enforcement priorities are made we would, therefore, expect that abilty to
pay and accessibility are key variables. In addition, we find that taxpayers who travel regularly to
other areas are more compliant than others. For instance, traders seem to be more compliant than
people in other occupations in the private sector. The higher compliance rate of migrants
compared to people born in the area, may also be due to more frequent travellng. In general, we
would expect that migrants maintain their relations with the family at their home-place, and, thus,
travel relatively more frequently than non-migrants. Since the police regularly controls travellers
at roadblocks and requires to see peoples' development levy receipts, we would expect that the
probabilty of being controlled is higher for persons who travel repeatedly compared to people
who travel less. To avoid police harassment and inconvenience "travellers" may therefore decide
to pay the levy "voluntarily".
(4) The relationship between taxation and public services (fiscal exchange): A critical
inter-mediating factor in understanding why many people refuse to pay development levy is the
perceived relationship between taxes paid and public services obtained. The name of the tax
indicates that taxpayers wil receive "development" in return from the tax paid. However, the levy
is widely perceived as unfair. Perceptions of exploitation due to unfair terms of trade with the
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government, promotes non-compliance. Peoples' tax resistance, thus, seems to be correlated to
deteriorating or, in some cases, non-existent public services.
(5) Reciprocity: How the tax law is administered and enforced seems to influence compliance
behaviour. In particular, the severity of sanctions seems to have fuelled tax resistance. This
contradicts the standard theory which tells us that the more severe the sanctions perceived by
taxpayers, the higher the compliance we would expect. Our survey results seem to point in the
opposite direction; the more severe the sanctions observed, the more widespread the tax
resistance. The reason for this "perverse" relationship is not entirely c1ear, however, it may be due
to reciprocity considerations: Tax authorities' unresponsive, corrupt, disrespectful and unfair
treatment of taxpayers foster disrespect for and resistance against tax authorities and tax laws.
Accordingly, harsh enforcement and harassment by collectors may induce tax evasion. Tax
evasion may, thus, to some extent be interpreted as a strategy of public resistance and opposition
against the authorities.
We have not explored the relative strength of the various factors in explaining the observed
patterns of tax compliance. However, the results in this paper suggest that the standard economic
influences of tax size and detection probabilty are at work, but that other determinants cannot be
ruled out when understanding taxpayers' behaviour. In paricular, the relationship between
taxation and service provision and how the tax law is enforced seem to be important. If our
analysis of the factors determining compliance as well non-compliance behaviour is correct, this
may contribute in explaining the observed differences in tax compliance between councils and
between areas within individual councils (see section l). Thus, the experience with development
levy may enrich our understanding of tax compliance behaviour in Tanzania. Further, the
experience with development levy also seems to have contributed to undermine tax morale and
the legitimacy of the state in away that may have long term consequences for the performanceof
local governments in Tanzania.
The study further provides us with some directions for future research. In improving our
understanding of tax compliance behaviour in developing countries, there is a need for more
thorough examination of the apparently important concept of unfairness in fiscal exchange, i.e.,
the contractual relationship between taxpayers and the government. Further, there is a need to
examine how taxpayers' perceptions of the probability of bein g detected are formed, inc1uding the
impacts of peer groups on the individual taxpayer's decisions. By broadening the conceptual
frameworks to inc1ude these types of socio-psychological and sociological variables which are
of ten ignored by economists, new and useful insights into economic behaviour wil be gained.
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Appendix 1
The institutional setup for local government tax collection
in Tanzania

Local government tax collection in Tanzania; institutional setup
In principle, the local government administrative structure in district councils is organised in a four
layer hierarchy:
i. District headquarter: The Revenue Deparment is responsible for tax collection.
Main staff: District Treasurer (DT), District Revenue Accountant (DRA) and District
Revenue Inspector (DT).
Il. Ward:
Main staff: Ward Executive Officer (WEO), Ward Revenue Collector (WRA), miltia.
m. Vilage:
Staff: Vilage Executive officer (VEG).
IV. Khitongoii:
Headed by a politically appointed khitongoji leader whose role is to mobilise people.
Figure A.I The institutional setup for local government
tax collection (district councils)
I
DISTRICT HQ
Revenue Dept.
(DT, DRA, DRI,...)
II
WARD
(WEO, WRC,
militia)
III
VILLAGE
(VEO)
IV KITONGOJI
(Kitongoji leader)

Appendix 2
Survey of taxpayers: The questionnaire

01.07.97 TAXPA YER.sam
Economic Research Bureau (ERB)
and
Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI)
Research project on local government
taxation and tax reforms
Interviewer............................. .
Interview no............................
Date........................................
Survey of Taxpayers in Kilosa District Council
Interviewer's introduction: The objective of the project is to examine how the local government tax
system functions in Tanzania. In this survey, we are particularly interested in exploring the problems
facing taxpayers.
Section I: Background information
Ward........................... Village. ............................ Kitongoji/Mitaa........................... .
N ame of Ward Executive Officer:......................................................................................
N ame of Village Chairman:................................................................................................
Name of Kitongoji/Mitaa Chairman: ... ..... .... ......... ........ ........... ..... ..... ...... .... .... .......... ..... ...
l) Age of the respondent (years): ............................
2) Gender: l( )M 2( )F
3) Marita! status: l( )Married 2( )Single
(Not been married)
3( )Other
specify........................ .
4) Household size (number): ......................
5) Were you born in this Region? l( ) Yes 2( )No
Jf No, what is your Home-Region? (specify) ..................................................................................
6) IfNo on question 5), when did you move to this Region?
Specify when (year)....................................................................
7) Was your spouse born in this Region? l( ) Yes 2( )No 3( )Sing1e
8) If No to question 7), what is your spouse's home-region?
(specify) .......................................
9) Religion: L ( ) Chr. Confession 2( )Muslim 3( )Other
l
01.07.97
Section Il: Household characteristics
Interviewer's introduction:
We wil now ask you some questions on details of your household.
10) Can you read and write? ie ) Yes 2e )No
l l) What kind of education do you have?
1 e ) Primary school
2 e ) Secondary school
3 e ) University/College
4 e ) Adult education c1asses
5 e ) N o formal school
12) Did you complete this education? 2eie )Yes )No
13) How many members of the household are contributing to the households income?
Write down the number:.........................................
14) What is the main occupation of adult members of the household?
Write the number of people belonging to each category in the brackets:
a e ) Self-employed, agriculture
b e ) Self-employed, trade and commerce eshops)
c e ) Self-employed, other especify)................................... ..
d e ) Wage-employee, private sector
e e ) Wage employee, Government and parastatal
15) What is the principal source of income in the household?
Rank in priority where l=most important; 2=second most important
a e ) Self-employed, agriculture
b e ) Self-employed, trade and commerce eshops)
c e ) Self-employed, other especify)...................................
d e ) Wage-employee, private sector
e e ) Wage employee, Government and parastatal
TAXPA YER.sam
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Section ILL: Ownership of assets
16) What is your major means of transport to work?
1 ( )Bicyc1e 2( )B Y foot 3( )Other (specify)..........
17) What are the major means of transport to work for other members of your household?
1( )Bicyc1e 2( )B Y foot 3( )Other (specify)..............................
18) Do you often listen to radio programmes? l( )Yes 2( )No
19) If Yes on question 18), do you listen to radio programmes in your own house?
1( )Yes 2( )No (specify).......................................
20) Do you own the house you live in? 1( )Yes 2( )No
2la) IfYes on question 20), which type of house do you own? fInterviewer ticksj
1( )Mud-wall 2( )Bloc wall 3( )Corrugated iron sheets (roof)
4( )Cement floor 5( )Other (specify)...... ..... ...... ... .... ...
2lb) IfNo on question 20), which type of house do you rent? fInterviewer ticksj
l( )Mud-wall 2( )Bloc wall 3( )Corrugated iron sheets (roof)
4( )Cement floor 5( )Other (specify). ......... .................
22) Does the respondent own a wristwatch? £lnterviewer ticksj
( )Yes 2( )No
Section iV: Development levy
Interviewer's introduction:
We are now through with the questions on the household and wil now ask you some questions about
development levy.
23) What is the current rate of the development levy?
1 ( ) Rate (specify):..............................................
2 ( ) Don't know
24) Have you paid development levy this year (1997)? l( )Yes 2( )No
25) If Yes on question 24), how much did you pay (specify)?...........................................
3
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26) Did you pay development levy last year (1996)? l( )Yes 2(
27) Jf Yes on question 26), how much did you pay (specify)?..........................................
28) Did you pay development levy last year (1995)? )Yes 2(l(
29) Jf Yes on question 28), how much did you pay (specify)?...........................................
30) What is your personal view on the leve1 of development levy in this district?
l ( ) Too high
2 ( ) Reasonable
3 ( ) Too low
31) Do you think it is appropriate to exempt women from paying development levy?
l( 3( )Don't know)Yes 2( )No
32) Do the vilagers get any information on how much deve10pment levy is collected here?
33) IfYes on 32), from whom?
1 ( ) Vilage chairman
2 ( ) Vilage executive officer (VEO)
3 ( ) Ward executive officer (WEO)
4 ( ) The councilor
5 ( ) District office
6 ( ) Employer
7 ( ) Other (specify).............................
8 ( ) Don't know
V: Procedures of collecting development levy
Interviewer's introduction:
We wil now ask you a few questions on the way tax collection is caried out.
34) Who collects development levy in your vilage?
l ( ) The Kitongoji/Mitaa chairman
2 ( ) The vilage chairman
3 ( ) The vil age executive officer (VEO)
4 ( ) The ward executive officer (WEO)
5 ( ) The councilor
6 ( ) The District office
7 ( ) The employer
8 ( ) Other (specify).............................
9 ( ) Don't know
TAXPA YER.sam
)No
)No
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35) What is the collection procedure when you pay development levy?
l ( ) Pay direct in cash to collector
2 ( ) Tax withhold via salary
3 ( ) Other (specify)........
4 ( ) Don't know
36) Do you receive a receipt from the collector when you pay development levy?
1 ( ) Never
2 ( ) Sometimes
3 ( ) Always
37) Jf (and when) you receive a receipt, is the receipt you receive on the same amount that you paid?
1 ( ) Higher
2 ( ) The same
3 ( ) Lower
38) Do you know someone in the neighbourhood who don't pay development levy?
l ( ) Many persons
2 ( ) ane person
3 ( ) A few persons
4 ( ) N o one at all
39) What is the reaction of the ward office to people who do not pay development levy?
1 ( ) No reaction
2 ( ) They have to pay tax plus penalty
3 ( ) Other forms of punishment (specify)..................................................................
4 ( ) Don't know
40) Within the last three years, have you or has someone you know personally been contacted by the
ward authorities and required to pay tax plus penalty?
l ( ) Never
2 ( ) Yes, once
3 ( ) Yes, a few times
4 ( ) Yes, often
4 l) Within the last three years, has someone you know personally been sent to Court because of not
paying developing levy?
l ( ) No, nobody
2 ( ) Yes, one person
3 ( ) Yes, a few persons
4 ( ) Yes, many persons
5
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42) Within the last three years, has someone you know personally been convicted for not paying
developing levy?
1 e ) No, nobody
2 e ) Yes, one person
3 e ) Yes, a few persons
4 e ) Yes, many persons
43) Do you think development levy with its problems is a preferred source of revenue?
ie )Yes 2e )No 3e )No view
44) If No on question 43), specify alternatives which could replace development levy
especify)..................................... .
VI: Perceptions of others behaviour
45) Kilosa District Council faces problems of collecting development levy. Whom do you consider is
most to blame for the incomplete collection of development levy in this area? Rank in priority where
l=most to blame; 2=second to blame
a e ) Taxpayers
b e ) Tax collectors
c e ) Civil servants at the ward leve1 especify)...........................................
d e ) Central Government politicians eeMembers of Parliament)
e e ) N o view
46) What do you consider is the major problem in collection of development levy? Rank in priority
where l=most important problem; 2=second most important
a e ) The rates are too high
b e ) The taxpayers are unwiling to pay taxes
c e ) There is already too many taxes
d e ) The tax collectors are dishonest
e e ) The tax collectors har ass people
fe) Local Government politicans are dishonest
g e ) Central Government politicans are dishonest
h e ) The taxes are not spent on public services
i e ) Other especify)..............................................
47) Do you agree with people who say that almost every taxpayer would cheat to some extent if he
thought he could get away with it?
l e ) Disagree
2e ) 50 - 50
3 e ) Agree
6
01.07.97
48) Why do you think some people pay development levy?
1 e ) They have no opportunity to evade
2 e ) They anticipate public services
3 e ) They feel obligations towards the Government
4 e ) They wil avoid disturbances
5 e ) Other especify)..................................
6 e ) Don't know
49) What is your view of tax collectors?
1 e ) They do as best they can
2 e ) They harass people
3 e ) They are dishonest
4 e ) They do not do as best they can
5 e ) Don't have any vie w
50) Was this also your view three years ago?1 e ) Yes 2e) No
eSpecify if No).....................................................
TAXPAYER.sam
3 e ) Don't know
51) During tax campaigns, do you observe that anyone from above the vilage level participate?
ie )Yes 2e )No
52) Jf Yes on question 51), specify etick more than one if necessar):
l e ) District level
2 e ) Ward level
3 e ) Police
4 e ) Other especify).....................
53) What is your view on Local Government politicians?
1 e ) They do as best they can
2 e ) They are dishonest
3 e ) They do not do as best they can
4 e ) Don't have any view
54) Was this also your view three years ago?
l e ) Yes 2e) No
eSpecify if No).....................................................
55) What is your view on Central Government politicians?
l e ) They do as best they can
2 e ) They are dishonest
3 e ) They do not do as best they can
4 e ) Don't have any view
3e )Don't know
3 e ) Don't know
7
01.07.97 TAXPAYER.sam
56) Was this also your view three years ago?
l ( ) Yes 2() No
(Specify if No).....................................................
3 ( ) Don't know
V: Tax compliance and public services
Interviewer's introduction:
Finally, we would like to ask you some questions on taxation and local government services in
Kilosa.
57) Do you consider that tax revenues collected in Kilosa are us ed to provide public services?
l ( ) Yes, most of it
2 ( ) Only parly
3 ( ) Not at all
4 ( ) Don't know
58) How do you rate the quality of local government services (e.g., roads, education, health services,
etc.) in Kilosa District?
l ( ) Good
2 ( ) Average
3 ( ) Bad
4( ) Don't know
59) What do you think of the quality of local government services today compared to three years ago?
l ( ) W orse than befare
2 ( ) About the same as befare
3 ( ) Better than before
4 ( ) Don't know
60) Do you think development levy should be used to pay the salaries of local government staff?
l( ) Yes 2( )No 3( ) Don't know
61) Jf No to question 60), who do you think should pay the salary of local government staff?
l ( ) District Council
2 ( ) Central Government
3 ( ) Donors
4 ( ) Others (specify).........................................................................................
5 ( ) Don't know
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62) Do you agree with people who say they wil not pay taxes until they get better services from the
Council in return?
1 ( ) Agree
2 ( ) Neither agree nor disagree (50-50)
3 ( ) Disagree
4 ( ) Don't know
63) Would you be wiling to pay more taxes if the public services were improved?
l ( ) Yes 2 ( )No 3 ( ) Don't know
Interviewer's final comments:
This was the last question. Thank you very much for yom kind assistance in answering om questions.
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